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Recent years have shown an increase in both the accuracy of biometric systems
and their practical use. The application of biometrics is becoming widespread with
fingerprint sensors in smartphones, automatic face recognition in social networks
and video-based applications, and speaker recognition in phone banking and other
phone-based services. The popularization of the biometric systems, however, ex-
posed their major flaw — high vulnerability to spoofing attacks [1]. A fingerprint
sensor can be easily tricked with a simple glue-made mold, a face recognition sys-
tem can be accessed using a printed photo, and a speaker recognition system can be
spoofed with a replay of pre-recorded voice. The ease with which a biometric system
can be spoofed demonstrates the importance of developing efficient anti-spoofing
systems that can detect both known (conceivable now) and unknown (possible in the
future) spoofing attacks.
Therefore, it is important to develop mechanisms that can detect such attacks,
and it is equally important for these mechanisms to be seamlessly integrated into ex-
isting biometric systems for practical and attack-resistant solutions. To be practical,
however, an attack detection should have (i) high accuracy, (ii) be well-generalized
for different attacks, and (iii) be simple and efficient.
One reason for the increasing demand for effective presentation attack detec-
tion (PAD) systems is the ease of access to people’s biometric data. So often, a
potential attacker can almost effortlessly obtain necessary biometric samples from
social networks, including facial images, audio and video recordings, and even ex-
tract fingerprints from high resolution images. Therefore, various privacy protection
solutions, such as legal privacy requirements and algorithms for obfuscating personal
information, e.g., visual privacy filters [2], as well as, social awareness of threats to
privacy can also increase security of personal information and potentially reduce the
vulnerability of biometric systems.
In this chapter, however, we focus on presentation attacks detection in voice bio-
metrics, i.e., automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems. We discuss vulnerabil-
ities of these systems to presentation attacks (PAs), present different state of the art
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Figure 1.1: Possible attacks places in a typical ASV system.
PAD systems, give the insights into their performances, and discuss the integration
of PAD and ASV systems.
1.1 Introduction
Given the complexity of a practical speaker verification system, several different
modules of the system are prone to attacks, as it is identified in ISO/IEC 30107-1
standard [3] and illustrated by Figure 1.1. Depending on the usage scenario, two of
the most vulnerable places for spoofing attacks in an ASV system are marked by A1
(aka ‘physical access’ as defined in [4] or presentation attacks) and A2 (aka ‘logical
access’ attacks as defined in [4]) in the figure. In this chapter, we are considering
A1 and A2 attacks, where the system can be attacked by presenting a spoofed signal
as input. For the other points of attacks from A3 to A9, the attacker needs to have
privileged access rights and know the operational details of the biometric system.
Prevention of or countering such attacks is more related to system-security, and is
thus out of the scope of this chapter.
There are three prominent methods through which A1 and A2 attacks can be car-
ried out: (a) by recording and replaying the target speakers speech, (b) synthesizing
speech that carries target speaker characteristics, and (c) by applying voice conver-
sion methods to convert impostor speech into target speaker speech. Among these
three, replay attack is the most viable attack, as the attacker mainly needs a record-
ing and playback device. In the literature, it has been found that ASV systems, while
immune to ‘zero-effort’ impostor claims and mimicry attacks [5], are vulnerable to
such presentation attacks (PAs) [6]. One of the reasons for such vulnerability is a
built-in ability of biometric systems in general, and ASV systems in particular, to
handle undesirable variabilities. Since spoofed speech can exhibit the undesirable
variabilities that ASV systems are robust to, the attacks can pass undetected.
Therefore, developing mechanisms for detection of presentation attacks is gain-
ing interest in the speech community [7]. In that regard, the emphasis until now has
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been on logical access attacks, largely thanks to the “Automatic Speaker Verifica-
tion Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge” [4], which provided a large bench-
mark corpus containing voice conversion-based and speech synthesis-based attacks.
In the literature, development of PAD systems has largely focused on investigating
short-term speech processing based features that can aid in discriminating genuine
speech from spoofed signal. This includes cepstral-based features [8], phase infor-
mation [9], and fundamental frequency based information, to name a few.
However, having presentation attack detection methods is not enough for prac-
tical use. Such PAD systems should be seamlessly and effectively integrated with
existing ASV systems. In this chapter, we integrate speaker verification and pre-
sentation attack detection systems by using score fusion considering parallel fusion
(see Figure 1.5) and cascading fusion (see Figure 1.6) schemes. The score fusion-
based systems integration allows to separate bona fide data of the valid users, who
are trying to be verified by the system, from both presentation attacks and genuine
data of the non-valid users or so-called zero-impostors. For ASV system, we adopt
verification approaches based on inter-session variability (ISV) modeling [10] and
i-vectors [11], as the state of the art systems for speaker verification.
1.1.1 Databases
Appropriate databases are necessary for testing different presentation attack detec-
tion approaches. These databases need to contain a set of practically feasible presen-
tation attacks and also data for speaker verification task, so that a verification system
can be tested for both issues: the accuracy of speaker verification and the resistance
to the attacks.
Currently, two comprehensive publicly available databases exist that can be used
for vulnerability analysis of ASV systems, the evaluation of PAD methods, and eval-
uation of joint ASV-PAD systems: ASVspoof1 and AVspoof2. Both databases con-
tain logical access attacks (LAs), while AVspoof also contains presentation attacks
(PAs). For the ease of comparison with ASVspoof, the set of attacks in AVspoof is
split into LA and PA subsets (see Table 1.1).
ASVspoof database
The ASVspoof1 database contains genuine and spoofed samples from 45 male and
61 female speakers. This database contains only speech synthesis and voice conver-
sion attacks produced via logical access, i.e., they are directly injected in the system.
The attacks in this database were generated with 10 different speech synthesis and
voice conversion algorithms. Only 5 types of attacks are in the training and devel-
opment set (S1 to S5), while 10 types are in the evaluation set (S1 to S10). Since
last five attacks appear in the evaluation set only and PAD systems are not trained on
them, they are considered ‘unknown’ attacks (see Table 1.1). This split of attacks al-
lows to evaluate the systems on known and unknown attacks. The full description of
1http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/298
2https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
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Table 1.1: Number of utterances in different subsets of AVspoof and ASVspoof
databases.
Database Type of data Train Dev Eval
AVspoof enroll data 780 780 868
impostors 54509 54925 70620
real data 4973 4995 5576
LA attacks 17890 17890 20060
PA attacks 38580 38580 43320
ASVspoof enroll data - 175 230
impostors - 9975 18400
real data 3750 3497 9404
Known attacks 12625 49875 92000
Unknown attacks - - 92000
Figure 1.2: AVspoof database recording setup.
the database and the evaluation protocol are given in [4]. This database was used for
the ASVspoof 2015 Challenge and is a good basis for system comparison as several
systems have already been tested on it.
AVspoof database
To our knowledge, the largest publicly available database containing speech presen-
tation attacks is AVspoof [6]2.
AVspoof database contains real (genuine) speech samples from 44 participants
(31 males and 13 females) recorded over the period of two months in four ses-
sions, each scheduled several days apart in different setups and environmental con-
ditions such as background noises. The recording devices, including microphone
AT2020USB+, Samsung Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone 3GS, and the environments
are shown in Figure 1.2. The first session was recorded in the most controlled con-
ditions.
From the recorded genuine data, two major types of attacks were created for
AVspoof database: logical access attacks, similar to those in ASVspoof database [4],
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and presentation attacks. Logical access attacks are generated using (i) a statistical
parametric-based speech synthesis algorithm [12] and (ii) a voice conversion algo-
rithm from Festvox3.
When generating presentation attacks, the assumption is that a verification sys-
tem is installed on a laptop (with an internal built-in microphone) and an attacker
is trying to gain access to this system by playing back to it a pre-recorded genuine
data or an automatically generated synthetic data using some playback device. In
AVspoof database, presentation attacks consist of (i) direct replay attacks when a
genuine data is played back using a laptop with internal speakers, a laptop with
external high quality speakers, Samsung Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone 3G, (ii) syn-
thesized speech replayed with a laptop, and (iii) converted voice attacks replayed
with a laptop.
The data in AVspoof database is split into three non-overlapping subsets: train-
ing or Train (real and spoofed samples from 4 female and 10 male participants),
development or Dev (real and spoofed samples from 4 female and 10 male partici-
pants), and evaluation or Eval (real and spoofed samples from 5 female and 11 male
participants). For more details on AVspoof database, please refer to [6].
1.1.2 Evaluation
Typically, in a single database evaluation, the training subset of a given database is
used for training a PAD or an ASV system. The development set is used for deter-
mining hyper-parameters of the system and evaluation set is used to test the system.
In a cross-database evaluation, the training and development sets are taken from one
database, while evaluation set is taken from another database. For PAD systems, a
cross-attack evaluation is also possible, when the training and development sets con-
tain one type of attack, e.g., logical access attacks only, while evaluation set contains
another type, e.g., presentation or replay attacks only.
Recent recommendations 30107-3 [13] from ISO/IEC committee specify the
evaluation procedure and metrics for ASV, PAD, and joint ASV-PAD systems, which
we briefly present in this chapter.
ASV and joint ASV-PAD systems are evaluated under two operational scenarios:
bona fide scenario with no attacks and the goal to separate genuine samples from
zero-effort impostors and spoof scenario with the goal to separate genuine samples
from attacks. For bona fide scenario, we report false match rate (FMR), which is
similar to FAR, and false non-match rate (FNMR), which is similar to FRR, while for
spoof scenario, we report impostor attack presentation match rate (IAPMR), which
is the proportion of attacks that incorrectly accepted as genuine samples by the joint
ASV-PAD system (for details, see recommendations in ISO/IEC 30107-3 [13]).
For evaluation of PAD systems, the following metrics are recommended: attack
presentation classification error rate (APCER) and bona fide presentation classifica-
3http://festvox.org/
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tion error rate (BPCER). APCER is the number of attacks misclassified as bona fide
samples divided by the total number of attacks, and is defined as follows:
APCER =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
(1−Resi), (1.1)
where N represents the number of attack presentations. Resi takes value 1 if the i-th
presentation is classified as an attack presentation, and value 0 if classified as a bona
fide presentation. Thus, APCER can we considered as the equivalent to FAR for
PAD systems, as it reflects the observed ratio of falsely accepted attack samples in
relation to the total number of presented attacks.
By definition, BPCER is the number of incorrectly classified bona fide (genuine)
samples divided by the total number of bona fide samples:
BPCER =
∑NBFi=1 Resi
NBF
, (1.2)
where NBF represents the number of bona fide presentations, and Resi is defined
similar to APCER. Thus, BPCER can we considered as the equivalent to FRR for
PAD systems, as it reflects the observed ratio of falsely rejected genuine samples in
relation to the total number of bona fide (genuine) samples. We compute equal error
rate (EER) as the rate when APCER and BPCER are equal.
When analyzing, comparing, and especially fusing PAD and ASV systems, it is
important that the scores are calibrated in a form of likelihood ratio. Raw scores can
be mapped to log-likelihood ratio scores with logistic regression classifier and an
associated cost of calibration Cllr together with a discrimination loss Cminllr are then
used as application-independent performance measures of calibrated PAD or ASV
systems. Calibration cost Cllr can be interpreted as a scalar measure that summarizes
the quality of the calibrated scores. A well-calibrated system has 0 ≤ Cllr < 1 and
produces well-calibrated likelihood ratio. Discrimination loss Cminllr can be viewed as
the theoretically best Cllr value of an optimally calibrated systems. For more details
on the score calibration and Cllr and Cminllr metrics, please refer to [14].
Therefore, in this chapter, we report EER rates (on Eval set) when testing the con-
sidered PAD systems on each database, for the sake of consistency with the previous
literature, notably [15], and BPCER and APCER of PAD systems (using the EER
threshold computed on Dev set) when testing PADs in cross-database scenario. EER
has been commonly used within the speech community to measure the performance
of ASV and PAD systems, while BPCER and APCER are the newly standardized
metrics and we advocate for the use of the open evaluation standards in the litera-
ture. We also report calibration cost Cllr and the discrimination loss Cminllr metrics for
the individual PAD systems. FMR, FNMR, and IAPMR are reported for ASV and
joint ASV-PAD systems on evaluation set (using EER threshold computed on the
development set).
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Figure 1.3: Histogram distributions of scores from i-vector based ASV system in
bona fide and spoof scenario, and MFCC-based PAD system.
1.2 Vulnerability of voice biometrics
The research on automatic speaker verification (ASV) is more established with regu-
lar competitions conducted by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
since 19964. Many techniques have been proposed with the most notable systems
based on Gaussian mixture model (GMM), inter-session variability (ISV) model-
ing [10], joint factor analysis (JFA) [16], and i-vectors [11].
To demonstrate vulnerability of ASV systems to presentation attacks, we con-
sider two systems based on inter-session variability (ISV) modeling [10] and i-
vectors [11], which are the state of the art speaker verification systems able to ef-
fectively deal with intra-class and inter-class variability. In these systems, voice
activity detection is based on the modulation of the energy around 4Hz, the features
include 20 mel-scale frequency coefficients (MFCC) and energy, with their first and
second derivatives, and modeling was performed with 256 Gaussian components
using 25 expectation-maximization (EM) iterations. Universal background model
(UBM) was trained using training set of publicly available MOBIO database5, while
the clients models are build using an enrollment data from the development set of
AVspoof database (only genuine data).
In i-vectors based system, for a given audio sample, the supervector of GMM
mean components (computed for all frames of the sample) is reduced to an i-vector
of the dimension 100, which essentially characterizes the sample. These i-vectors
are compensated for channel variability using linear discriminative analysis (LDA)
and within class covariance normalization (WCCN) techniques (see [11] for more
details).
Table 1.2 demonstrates how i-vectors and ISV-based ASV systems perform in
two different scenarios: (i) when there are no attacks present (zero-impostors only),
referred to as bona fide scenario (defined by ISO/IEC [13]), and (ii) when the system
is being spoofed with presentation attacks, referred to as spoof scenario. Histograms
of score distribution in Figure 1.3b also illustrate the effect of attacks on i-vectors
based ASV system in spoof scenario, compared to bona fide scenario in Figure 1.3a.
4http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/sre.cfm
5https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/mobio
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Table 1.2: ISV-based and i-vector ASVs on evaluation set of AVspoof database.
ASV system Zero-impostors only PAs only
FMR (%) FNMR (%) IAPMR (%)
ISV-based 4.46 9.90 92.41
i-vectors based 8.85 8.31 94.04
From Table 1.2, it can be noted that both ASV systems perform relatively well
under bona fide scenario with ISV-based system showing lower FMR of 4.46%.
However, when a spoofed data is introduced, without a PAD system in place, the
IAPMR significantly increases reaching 92.41% for ISV-based and 94.04% for i-
vectors based systems. It means that a typical verification system is not able to
correctly distinguish presentation attacks from genuine data.
1.3 Presentation attack detection approaches
As was shown in the previous section, ASV systems are highly susceptible to presen-
tation attacks. This vulnerability motivated researchers to propose different systems
and methods for detecting such attacks (see Figure 1.4). In this section, we present
the most commonly used recent approaches and discuss feature extraction and clas-
sification components, as well as, score fusion integration technique.
Feature 
extractor Classifier
Raw speech 
signal
Bona fide/
attack 
decision
Figure 1.4: Presentation attack detection system.
1.3.1 Features
A survey by Wu et al. [7] provides a comprehensive overview of both the existing
spoofing attacks and the available attack detection approaches. An overview of the
methods for synthetic speech detection by Sahidullah et al. [15] benchmarks several
existing feature extraction methods and classifiers on ASVspoof database.
Existing approaches to feature extraction for speech spoofing attack detection
methods include spectral- and cepstral-based features [8], phase-based features [9],
the combination of amplitude and phase features of the spectrogram [17], and audio
quality based features [18]. Features directly extracted from a spectrogram can also
be used, as per the recent work that relies on local maxima of spectrogram [19].
Compared to cepstral coefficients, using phase information extracted from the
signal seem to be more effective for anti-spoofing detection, as it was shown by De
Leon et al. [9] and Wu et al. [20]. However, the most popular recent approaches
rely on the combination of spectral-based and phase-based features [17, 21, 22, 23].
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Most of these features are used successfully in speaker verification systems already,
so, naturally, they are first to be proposed for anti-spoofing systems as well.
In addition to these spectral-based features, features based on pitch frequency
patterns have been proposed [24, 25]. There are also methods that aim to extract
“pop-noise” related information that is indicative of the breathing effect inherent in
normal human speech [8].
Constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs) [26] features were proposed recently
and they have shown a superior performance in detecting both know and unknown
attacks in ASVspoof database. Also, a higher computational layer can be added,
for instance, Alegre et al. [27] proposed to use histograms of Local Binary Patterns
(LBP), which can be computed directly from a set of pre-selected spectral, phase-
based, or other features.
1.3.2 Classifiers
Besides determining ‘good features for detecting presentation attacks’, it is also im-
portant to correctly classify the computed feature vectors as belonging to bona fide
or spoofed data. Choosing a reliable classifier is especially important given a pos-
sibly unpredictable nature of attacks in a practical system, since it is unknown what
kind of attack the perpetrator may use when spoofing the verification system. The
most common approach to classification is to use one of the well-known classifiers,
which is usually pre-trained on the examples of both real and spoofed data. To sim-
ulate realistic environments, the classifier can be trained on a subset of the attacks,
termed known attacks, and tested on a larger set of attacks that include both known
and unknown attacks.
Different methods use different classifiers but the most common choices include
logistic regression, support vector machine (SVM), and Gaussian mixture model
(GMM) classifiers. The benchmarking study on logical access attacks [15] finds
GMMs to be more successful compared to two-class SVM (combined with an LBP-
based feature extraction from [27]) in detecting synthetic spoofing attacks. Deep
learning networks are also showing promising performance in simultaneous feature
selection and classification [28].
1.3.3 Fusion
Fusion of different features or the results of different classification systems is a natu-
ral way of combining different systems, in our case, PAD and ASV systems to create
a joint verification system resistant to the attacks.
In this chapter, we focus on a score level fusion as a means to integrate different
ASV and PAD systems into one joint system. Due to relative simplicity of such
fusion and the evidence that it leads to a better performing combined systems, this
operation has become popular among researchers. However, the danger is to rely on
score fusion blindly without studying how it can affect different systems in different
scenarios.
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Figure 1.5: A joint ASV-PAD system based on parallel score fusion.
Cascading fusion PAD -> ASV
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Figure 1.6: A joint PAD-ASV system based on cascading score fusion (reversed
order of the systems leads to the same results).
One way to fuse ASV and PAD systems at the score level is to use a parallel
scheme, as it is illustrated in Figure 1.5. In this case, the scores from each of N
system are combined into a new feature vector of length N that need to be classified.
The classification task can be performed using different approaches, and, in this
chapter, we consider three different algorithms: (i) a logistic regression classifier,
denoted as ‘LR’, which leads to a straight line separation, as illustrated by the scatter
plot in Figure 1.7a, (ii) a polynomial logistic regression, denoted as ‘PLR’, which
results in a polynomial separation line, and (iii) a simple mean function, denoted as
‘Mean’, which is taken on scores of the fused systems. For ‘LR’ and ‘PLR’ fusion,
the classifier is pre-trained on the score-feature vectors from a training set.
Another common way to combine PAD and ASV systems is a cascading scheme,
in which one system is used first and only the samples that are accepted by this
system (based on its own threshold) are then passed to the second system, which
will further filter the samples, using its own independently determined threshold.
Effectively, cascading scheme can be viewed as a logical and of two independent
systems. Strictly speaking, when considering one PAD and one ASV systems, there
are two variants of cascading scheme: (i) when ASV is used first, followed by PAD,
and (ii) when PAD is used first, followed by ASV (see Figure 1.6). Although these
schemes are equivalent, i.e., and operation is commutative, and they both lead to
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the same filtering results (the same error rates), we consider variant (ii), since it is
defined in ISO/IEC 30107-1 standard [3].
When using a score level fusion, it is important to perform a thorough evaluation
of the combined/fused system to understand how incorporating PAD system affects
verification accuracy for both real and spoofed data. In the upcoming parts of this
chapter, we therefore adopt and experimentally apply an evaluation methodology
specifically designed for performance assessment of fusion system proposed in [29].
1.4 PADs failing to generalize
To demonstrate the performance of PAD systems in single database and in cross-
database scenario, we have selected several state of the art methods for presentation
attacks detection in speech, which were recently evaluated by Sahidullah et al. [15]
on ASVspoof database with an addition of CQCC features based method [26].
These systems rely on GMM-based classifier (two models for real and attacks,
512 Gaussians components with 10 EM iterations for each model), since it has
demonstrated improved performance compared to support vector machine (SVM) on
the data from ASVspoof database. Four cepstral-based features with mel-scale, i.e.,,
mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [30], rectangular (RFCC), inverted mel-
scale (IMFCC), and linear (LFCC) filters [31] were selected. These features are com-
puted from a power spectrum (power of magnitude of 512-sized fast Fourier trans-
form) by applying one of the above filters of a given size (we use size 20 as per [15]).
Spectral flux-based features, i.e., subband spectral flux coefficients (SSFC) [32],
which are Euclidean distances between power spectrums (normalized by the max-
imum value) of two consecutive frames, subband centroid frequency (SCFC) [33],
and subband centroid magnitude (SCMC) [33] coefficients are considered as well.
A discrete cosine transform (DCT-II) is applied to these above features, except for
SCFC, and first 20 coefficients are taken. Before computing selected features, a
given audio sample is first split into overlapping 20ms-long speech frames with 10ms
overlap. The frames are pre-emphasized with 0.97 coefficient and pre-processed by
applying Hamming window. Then, for all features, deltas and double-deltas [34] are
computed and only these derivatives (40 in total) are used by the classifier. Only
deltas and deta-deltas are kept, because [15] reported that static features degraded
performance of PAD systems.
In addition to the above features, we also consider recently proposed CQCC [26],
which are computed using constant Q transform instead of FFT. To be consistent with
the other features and fair in the systems comparison, we used also only delta and
delta-deltas (40 features in total) derived from 19 plus C0 coefficients.
The selected PAD systems are evaluated on each ASVspoof and AVspoof database
and in cross-database scenario. To keep results comparable with current state of the
art work [15, 35], we computed average EER (Eval set) for single database evalua-
tions and APCER with BPCER for cross-database evaluations. APCER with BPCER
are computed for Eval set of a given dataset using the EER threshold obtained from
the Dev set from another dataset (see Table 1.4).
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Table 1.3: Performance of PAD systems in terms of average EER (%), Cllr, and Cminllr
of calibrated scores for evaluation sets of ASVspoof [4] and AVspoof [6] databases.
PADs ASVspoof (Eval) AVspoof (Eval)
Known S10 Unknown LA PA
EER Cllr Cminllr EER EER Cllr C
min
llr EER Cllr C
min
llr EER Cllr C
min
llr
SCFC 0.11 0.732 0.006 23.92 5.17 0.951 0.625 0.00 0.730 0.000 5.34 0.761 0.160
RFCC 0.14 0.731 0.009 6.34 1.32 0.825 0.230 0.04 0.729 0.001 3.27 0.785 0.117
LFCC 0.13 0.730 0.005 5.56 1.20 0.818 0.211 0.00 0.728 0.000 4.73 0.811 0.153
MFCC 0.47 0.737 0.023 14.03 2.93 0.877 0.435 0.00 0.727 0.000 5.43 0.812 0.165
IMFCC 0.20 0.730 0.007 5.11 1.57 0.804 0.192 0.00 0.728 0.000 4.09 0.797 0.137
SSFC 0.27 0.733 0.016 7.15 1.60 0.819 0.251 0.70 0.734 0.027 4.70 0.800 0.160
SCMC 0.19 0.731 0.009 6.32 1.37 0.812 0.229 0.01 0.728 0.000 3.95 0.805 0.141
CQCC 0.10 0.732 0.008 1.59 0.58 0.756 0.061 0.66 0.733 0.028 3.84 0.796 0.128
Table 1.4: Performance of PAD systems in terms of average APCER (%), BPCER
(%), and Cllr of calibrated scores in cross-database testing on ASVspoof [4] and
AVspoof [6] databases.
PADs ASVspoof (Train/Dev) AVspoof-LA (Train/Dev)
AVspoof-LA (Eval) AVspoof-PA (Eval) ASVspoof (Eval) AVspoof-PA (Eval)
APCER BPCER Cllr APCER BPCER Cllr APCER BPCER Cllr APCER BPCER Cllr
SCFC 0.10 2.76 0.751 10.20 2.76 0.809 15.12 0.00 0.887 39.62 0.35 0.970
RFCC 0.29 69.57 0.887 7.51 69.57 0.927 26.39 0.00 0.902 48.32 2.86 0.988
LFCC 1.30 0.13 0.740 21.03 0.13 0.868 17.70 0.00 0.930 37.49 0.02 0.958
MFCC 1.20 2.55 0.764 17.09 2.55 0.838 10.60 0.00 0.819 19.72 1.22 0.870
IMFCC 4.57 0.00 0.761 92.98 0.00 1.122 99.14 0.00 1.164 43.00 0.60 0.966
SSFC 4.81 64.47 0.899 18.89 64.47 0.973 71.84 0.68 1.047 63.45 23.54 1.070
SCMC 0.75 1.70 0.750 22.61 1.70 0.866 15.94 0.00 0.861 45.97 0.01 0.978
CQCC 13.99 57.05 0.968 66.29 57.05 1.191 44.65 0.61 1.009 0.86 100.00 1.009
To avoid prior to the evaluations, the raw scores from each individual PAD sys-
tem are pre-calibrated with logistic regression based on Platts sigmoid method [36]
by modeling scores of the training set and applying the model on the scores from
development and evaluation sets. The calibration cost Cllr and the discrimination
loss Cminllr of the resulted calibrated scores are provided.
In Table 1.3, the results for known and unknown attacks (see Table 1.1) of Eval
set of ASVspoof are presented separately to demonstrate the differences between
these two types of attacks provided in ASVspoof database. The main contribution
to the higher EER of unknown is given by a more challenging attack ‘S10’ of the
evaluation set.
Since AVspoof contains both logical access (LA for short) and presentation at-
tacks (PA), the results for these two types of attacks are also presented separately.
Hence, it allows to compare the performance on ASVspoof database (it has logical
access attacks only) with an AVspoof-LA attacks.
From the results in Table 1.3, we can note that (i) LA set of AVspoof is less
challenging compared to ASVspoof for almost all methods, (ii) unknown attacks for
which PAD is not trained is more challenging, and (iii) presentation attacks are also
more challenging compared to LA attacks.
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Table 1.4 presents the cross-database results when a given PAD system is trained
and tuned using training and development sets from one database but is tested using
evaluation set from another database. For instance, results in the second column
of the table are obtained by using training and development sets from ASVspoof
database but evaluation set from AVspoof-LA. Also, we evaluated the effect of using
one type of attacks (e.g., logical access from AVspoof-LA) for training and another
type (e.g., presentation attacks of AVspoof-PA) for testing (the results are in the last
column of the table).
From the results in Table 1.4, we can note that all methods generalize poorly
across different datasets with BPCER reaching 100%, for example, CQCC-based
PAD shows poor performance for all cross-database evaluations. It is also interesting
to note that even similar methods, for instance, RFCC and MFCC-based, have very
different accuracy in cross-database testing, even though they showed less drastic
difference in single-database evaluations (see Table 1.3).
1.5 Integration of PAD and ASV
As described in Section 1.3, multiple presentation attack detection systems have been
considered to detect whether a given speech sample is real or spoofed. However, the
purpose of a PAD system is to work in tandem with a verification system, so that the
joint system can effectively separate the genuine data from both zero-effort impostors
(genuine data but incorrect identity) and spoofed attacks (spoofed data for the correct
identity).
Table 1.5: Fusing i-vector and ISV-based verification systems with the selected
MFCC-based PAD (in bold in Tables 1.3 and 1.4) on evaluation set of AVspoof-PA.
ASV system Fused with PAD Type of fusion Zero-impostors only PAs only
FMR (%) FNMR (%) IAPMR (%)
no fusion - 4.46 9.90 92.41
ISV-based MFCC Cascade 6.57 12.00 4.19
MFCC Mean 23.05 22.73 28.98
MFCC LR 25.40 24.72 2.68
MFCC PLR 4.97 10.75 5.17
midrule no fusion - 8.85 8.31 94.04
i-vectors based MFCC Cascade 10.83 11.45 3.89
MFCC Mean 26.33 19.44 19.47
MFCC LR 8.77 8.33 94.28
MFCC PLR 9.60 10.47 95.76
As presented in Section 1.3.3, in a score-based fusion of PAD and ASV systems,
we make a decision about each speech sample using the scores from both PAD and
ASV. The resulted joint system can effectively distinguish genuine data from presen-
tation attacks, as demonstrated in Figure 1.7b for ASV based on i-vector integrated
with an example of MFCC-based PAD system. We have chosen MFFC-based sys-
tem as an example for Figure 1.7, because, from the Table 1.5 it is clear that applying
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Figure 1.7: A scatter plot, histogram distributions, and DET curves for joint i-vector
ASV and MFCC-based PAD systems.
cascade fusion scheme to join an ASV system with MFCC leads to more superior
performance compared to other fusion schemes and algorithms.
As results presented in Table 1.5 demonstrate, integration with PAD system can
effectively reduce IAPMR from above 90% of the ASV (both ISV-based and i-
vector) down to 3.89%, which is the best performing system of i-vector ASV fused
with MFCC-based PAD via cascade fusion (see Figure 1.7c for DET plots of differ-
ent scenarios). Such drastic improvement in the attack detection comes with an in-
crease in FMR (from 4.46% to 6.57% when ASV is ISV and from 8.85% to 10.83%
when ASV is i-vector). FNMR also increases.
Please note that an important advantage of using MFCC-based PAD is that MFCC
are the most commonly used fast to compute features in speech processing, which
makes it practical to use MFCC-based PAD for fusion with an ASV.
The Table 1.5 also shows that cascading fusion leads to a better overall perfor-
mance compared to parallel scheme. However, compared to a cascading scheme,
where each fused system is independent and has to be tuned separately for disjoint
set of parameter requirements, parallel scheme is more flexible, because it allows to
tune several parameters of the fusion, as if it was one single system consisting of
interdependent components. Such flexibility can be valuable in practical systems.
See [29] for a detailed comparison of the different fusion schemes and their discus-
sion.
1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the existing presentation attack detec-
tion (PAD) systems for voice biometrics and present evaluation results for selected
eight systems on two most comprehensive publicly available databases, AVspoof and
ASVspoof. The cross-database evaluation results of these selected methods demon-
strate that state of the art PAD systems generalize poorly across different databases
and data. The methods generalize especially poorly, when they were trained on ‘log-
ical access’ attacks and tested on more realistic presentation attacks, which means a
new and more practically applicable attack detection methods need to be developed.
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We also consider score-based integration of several PAD and ASV systems fol-
lowing both cascading and parallel schemes. Presented evaluation results show a
significantly increased resistance of joined ASV-PAD systems to presentation at-
tacks from AVspoof database, with cascading fusion leading to a better overall per-
formance compared to parallel scheme.
Presentation attack detection in voice biometrics is far from being solved, as cur-
rently proposed methods do not generalize well across different data. It means that
no effective method is yet proposed that would make speaker verification system
resistant even to trivial replay attacks, which prevents the wide adoption of ASV
systems in practical applications, especially in security sensitive areas. Deep learn-
ing methods for PAD are showing some promise and may be able to solve the issue
of generalizing across different attacks.
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